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Assessing the Overall Sufficiency of Safety 
Arguments 
Anaheed Ayoub, Jian Chang, Oleg Sokolsky and Insup Lee 
Computer and Information Science Department, University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA, USA 
Abstract   Safety cases offer a means for communicating information about the 
system safety among the system stakeholders. Recently, the requirement for a 
safety case has been considered by regulators for safety-critical systems. Adopting 
safety cases is necessarily dependent on the value added for regulatory authorities. 
In this work, we outline a structured approach for assessing the level of suffi-
ciency of safety arguments. We use the notion of basic probability assignment to 
provide a measure of sufficiency and insufficiency for each argument node. We 
use the concept of belief combination to calculate the overall sufficiency and in-
sufficiency of a safety argument based on the sufficiency and insufficiency of its 
nodes. The application of the proposed approach is illustrated by examples. 
1 Introduction 
A safety assurance case presents an argument, supported by a body of evidence, 
that a system is acceptably safe to be used in the given context (Menon et al. 
2009). Recently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been high-
lighting the upcoming call for certain 510(k) medical device submissions to in-
clude safety assurance cases (FDA 2010). Adopting safety cases necessarily re-
quires the existence of proper reviewing mechanisms. 
Safety cases are, by their nature, often subjective (Kelly 2007). The objective 
of safety case development, therefore, is to facilitate mutual acceptance of this 
subjective position. The goal of safety case evaluation, therefore, is to assess if 
there is a mutual acceptance of the subjective position. We define the safety ar-
gument assessment as answering a question about the overall sufficiency of the 
argument, i.e., are the premises of the argument ‘strong enough’ to support the 
conclusions being drawn. The simplest way to assess a safety argument is to ask 
an expert reviewer to evaluate the overall sufficiency of the argument. Although 
this is a commonly accepted practice, most probably the final decision is not accu-
rate enough. Research in experimental psychology shows that the human mind 
does not deal properly with complex inferences based on uncertain sources of 
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knowledge (Cyra and Gorski 2008a), which is common in safety arguments. 
Therefore, reviewers should only be required to express their opinions about the 
basic elements in the safety argument. Then a mechanism should provide a way to 
aggregate the reviewer opinions to communicate a message about the overall suf-
ficiency of the safety argument. A potential problem with evaluating the safety 
arguments lies in psychology and the notion of a mindset. A mindset is a set of 
assumptions, methods or notations held by one or more people or groups of people 
which is so established that it creates a powerful incentive within these people or 
groups to continue to adopt or accept prior behaviours, choices, or tools (Wikipe-
dia 2012b). An important component of mindset is the concept of confirmation 
bias. Confirmation bias is a tendency for people to favour information that con-
firms their preconceptions or hypotheses regardless of whether the information is 
true (Leveson 2011). Confirmation bias is a prime example of a mindset that can 
produce defective decision making. The problem of the confirmation bias is not 
easy to eliminate. But it can be reduced by changing the goal. In other words, the 
reviewer should take the opposite goal: try to show that the provided safety argu-
ment is insufficient to support the system safety conclusion. We propose assessing 
the safety argument insufficiency as well as its sufficiency. 
In this paper, we outline a structured method for assessing the level of suffi-
ciency and insufficiency of safety arguments (Section 4). The reviewer assess-
ments and the results of their aggregation are represented in the Dempster-Shafer 
model (Sentz and Ferson 2002). We use the notion of basic probability assign-
ment (also referred to as a degree of belief or a mass) to provide a measure of the 
degree of belief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of each argument node to do 
its role. For example, a mass of the sufficiency and insufficiency of an evidence 
node Ev, which is directly addressing a conclusion node n, is a measure of the 
degree of belief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of Ev to support n.  
We propose aggregation rules (Section 3) to calculate the mass of the overall 
sufficiency and insufficiency of a safety argument by aggregating the mass of the 
sufficiency and insufficiency of the safety argument nodes. The selection of the 
appropriate aggregation rule is discussed in Section 4.1. The assessing of the miss-
ing support (if any) and its impact on the degree of beliefs is given in Section 4.2. 
The application of the proposed method is illustrated by a complete example in 
Section 5. The related work is discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
2 Safety cases 
Recently, safety cases are being explored as ways for communicating ideas and 
information about the safety-critical systems among the system stakeholders. The 
manufactures submit safety cases (to present a clear, comprehensive and defensi-
ble argument supported by evidence) to the regulators to show that their products 
are acceptably safe to operate in the intended context (Kelly 1999). There are dif-
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ferent approaches to structure and present safety cases. The Goal Structuring No-
tation (GSN) is one of the description techniques that have been proven to be use-
ful for constructing safety cases (Kelly and Weaver 2004). In this work, we use 
the GSN notation in presenting safety cases. In GSN a top-level goal (i.e., conclu-
sion) is decomposed into sub-goals through implicit or explicit strategy, and even-
tually supported by evidence. In this paper, we use the term conclusion to describe 
the relation between any goal, sub-goal or strategy and its child nodes. Also we 
use the term supporting node to describe how any sub-goal, strategy or evidence 
node is related to its parent node. For example, Strategy S1 in Figure 7 is a con-
clusion for G2 and G3, and a supporting node for G1. 
A new approach for creating clear safety cases is introduced in (Hawkins et al. 
2011). This new approach basically separates the major components of the safety 
cases into safety argument and confidence argument. A safety argument is limited 
to give arguments and evidence that directly target the system safety. A confi-
dence argument is given separately to justify the sufficiency of confidence in this 
safety argument. The separation between safety and confidence related aspects 
facilitates the development and reviewing processes for safety cases. In this paper, 
we introduce a structured mechanism to assess the overall sufficiency and insuffi-
ciency of safety arguments. Confidence arguments should be used by the reviewer 
to make his/her assessments on the sufficiency and insufficiency of the evidence 
nodes. 
3 Aggregation rules 
We define the safety argument assessment as answering the question about the 
overall sufficiency of the argument, i.e., are the premises of the argument ‘strong 
enough’ to support the conclusions being drawn. The first step of the proposed 
assessment procedure is to ask the reviewer to express his/her opinion about the 
basic elements in the safety argument. Then a systematic mechanism is used to 
aggregate the reviewer opinions to communicate a message about the overall suf-
ficiency of the safety argument. The process of assessing the argument basic ele-
ments is nothing but a decision-making process. Decision making can be regarded 
as the mental processes resulting in the selection of a course of action among sev-
eral alternative scenarios (Wikipedia 2012a). Every decision making process pro-
duces a final choice. In the case of evaluating the safety argument node, the output 
would be a choice either the node under evaluation is sufficient or not. According 
to psychologists, a natural phenomenon known as confirmation bias contaminates 
the mental process of the decision-making. Confirmation bias is a tendency for 
people to favour information that confirms their preconceptions or hypotheses 
regardless of whether the information is true (Leveson 2011). For example, in the 
case of evaluating the safety argument nodes, the reviewer may have an existing 
belief that the submitter of the safety argument is trusted based on his reputation, 
and probably the system is safe based on past success. In this case, the reviewer 
will choose to focus on the facts that conform to his/her existing belief. If the re-
viewer is not careful, his/her mind that is biased toward confirming the safety ar-
4      Anaheed Ayoub, Jian Chang, Oleg Sokolsky and Insup Lee 
gument sufficiency would prevent him/her from seeing any contrary evidence that 
is actually there. Consequently, the reviewer decision would be that the node is 
sufficient; however this may not be the truth. This is one of the main problems of 
the Nimrod safety case (NSC) (Haddon-Cave 2009), the safety case was built and 
reviewed with the mindset that the system is safe based on past success. Conse-
quently, NSC failed to identify the design flaws that led to the total loss of the 
Nimrod. The case of NSC shows how the consequences of confirmation bias to 
decision making are serious. In order to fight the confirmation bias the reviewer 
should do the opposite; assess the safety argument insufficiency. Although assess-
ing the insufficiency fights the confirmation bias, it increases the vulnerability to 
negative confirmation bias. The existing belief in case of negative confirmation 
bias would be that the node is insufficient.  To fight confirmation bias and nega-
tive confirmation bias, we propose that the reviewer assesses his/her belief in the 
sufficiency and insufficiency of the argument nodes. This forces the reviewer to 
evaluate the node from two different perspectives; the positive one (the node is 
sufficient) and the negative one (it is insufficient). In addition, the reviewer may 
not be able to precisely determine if the node is sufficient or insufficient, meaning 
that he/she has a belief that this node could either be sufficient or insufficient. In 
other words, the reviewer describes his/her belief in the node sufficiency and in-
sufficiency, and then the gap between these two beliefs presents the uncertainty. 
3.1 Dempster-Shafer theory 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is a mathematical theory of evidence (Sentz and 
Ferson 2002). It offers an alternative to traditional probabilistic theory for the 
mathematical representation for uncertainty, which is required for the safety ar-
guments assessment. DST is a potentially valuable tool when knowledge is ob-
tained from expert’s elicitation, which is the case of safety arguments assessment. 
We use the Dempster-Shafer model to present the reviewer assessments and the 
results of their aggregation. The most important part of DST is basic probability 
assignment (BPA), also referred to as a degree of belief or a mass. Let x be a finite 
set known as frame of discernment. In the safety argument assessment, x = {Suffi-
cient, Insufficient}. The power set P(x) is the set of all subsets of x including itself 
and null set  . For x = {Sufficient, Insufficient} then P(x) = { , {Sufficient}, {In-
sufficient}, {Sufficient, Insufficient}}. The BPA, represented by m, defines a map-
ping from every subset of the power set to interval between 0 and 1. Formally, 
m:P(x)   [0, 1]. The BPA satisfies the following two conditions: 
 The BPA of the null set is 0. Formally, m( ) = 0. 
 The summation of the BPA's of all the subsets of the power set is 1. That is, 
( )
( ) 1
A P x
m A

 , where A is a set in the power set ( ( )A P x ). 
Every set in the power set of the frame of discernment which has mass > 0 is a 
focal element (i.e., hypotheses). For the safety argument assessment, P(x) has 
three focal elements: hypothesis S = {Sufficient} that the node is sufficient, hy-
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pothesis I = {Insufficient} that it is insufficient, and (universe) hypothesis U = 
{Sufficient, Inefficient} that the node is either sufficient or insufficient. For each 
argument node n, mn(S) and mn(I) represent the degree of belief in the sufficiency 
and insufficiency of n. And mn(U) represents the uncertainty; n is either sufficient 
or insufficient, where mn(S) + mn(I) + mn(U) =1. 
Example 1. Suppose the reviewer checked the confidence argument/measure pro-
vided for node n, and got a belief of 0.5 that n is sufficient (mn(S) = 0.5). How-
ever, he/she got a belief in n insufficiency with a degree 0.2 (mn(I) = 0.2). The 
remaining mass of 0.3, which is the gap between the 0.5 supporting n sufficiency 
on one hand and the 0.2 for n insufficiency on the other hand is ‘indeterminate’. 
Which means that n could either be sufficiency or insufficient (mn(U) = 0.3). 
One of the main attractions of DST is the availability of a rule to combine the data 
obtained from multiple sources. It allows one to combine evidence from different 
sources and arrive at a degree of belief. This is the case of addressing a conclusion 
supported by different nodes, where each supporting node arrives with a degree of 
belief. DST is based on the assumption that these supporting nodes are independ-
ent. The original combination rule of multiple BPA's is known as Dempster’s rule 
of combination (Voorbraak 2012).  
Definition 1. Given two BPA's m1 and m2, the combination (called joint m) is cal-
culated from the aggregation of m1 and m2 as: 
( ) 0m    
1 2
1 2
( ) * ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
A B C
m A m B
m C m C m C
K
 
  

  where C   
1 2
( ) * ( )
A B
K m A m B
 
  . 
The denominator, 1 – K, is a normalization factor, which is a measure of the 
amount of conflict between the two supporting nodes. For the safety argument 
assessment, C is S, I, or U. The Dempster’s rule of combination is commutative 
and associative. For the simple case shown in Figure 1, a conclusion node n1 (i.e., 
GSN goal, sub-goal, or strategy node) is addressed by two supporting nodes n2 
and n3 (i.e., GSN sub-goal, strategy, or evidence nodes). The pairs for A and B 
sets for which A B S  are (S and S), (S and U), and (U and S). The pairs for A 
and B sets for which A B I  are (I and I), (I and U), and (U and I). The pairs 
for A and B sets for which A B   are (S and I), and (I and S). 
n1
n2 n3
 
Fig. 1. A simple case 
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The following definition, which we will frequently use in the rest of the paper, is 
the application of Definition 1 to the simple case given in Figure 1. 
Definition 2. 
1 2 3
2 3 2 3 2 3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) * ( ) ( ) * ( ) ( ) * ( )
1
n n n
n n n n n n
m S m S m S
m S m S m S m U m U m S
K
 
 


 
1 2 3
2 3 2 3 2 3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) * ( ) ( ) * ( ) ( ) * ( )
1
n n n
n n n n n n
m I m I m I
m I m I m I m U m U m I
K
 
 

  
2 3 2 3
( ) * ( ) ( ) * ( )
n n n n
K m S m I m I m S  . 
There is a known problem with the normalization of Dempster’s rule of combina-
tion as explained in (Zadeh 84). We avoid this issue because the elements of our 
sets (S, I and U) are not independent.  
3.2 Mixing 
In addition to using Dempster’s rule of combination, we also use a mixing (i.e., 
weighted averaging) rule. 
Definition 3. The mixing rule: 1 1 2 2
1 2
* ( ) * ( )
( )
w m C w m C
m C
w w



, where 
1
w and 
2
w are the weights assigned to the supporting nodes. These weights represent the 
coverage of the conclusion by each supporting node. The weighted averaging rule 
of combination is commutative and associative. The following definition, which 
we will frequently use in the rest of the paper, is the application of Definition 3 to 
the simple case given in Figure 1. 
Definition 4. 
21
3221
1
)(*)(*
)(
ww
CmwCmw
Cm
nn
n


 , where 1w and 2w  represent 
the coverage of n1 by n2 and n3 respectively. The use of mixing rules with 
Dempster-Shafer structures is justified in (Sentz and Ferson 2002). 
Definitions 1 and 3 give the general form of the aggregation rules. Definitions 2 
and 4 are the case of instantiation to the safety argument assessment settings for 
two supporting nodes. Discussions for the criteria to select between the aggrega-
tion rules (Definition 2 and Definition 4), and how to apply these rules to aggre-
gate the degree of belief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of the argument 
nodes, are given in Section 4.1. 
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 4 Assessment mechanism 
The move toward using safety cases in certification and regulation requires a way 
to review them. Safety cases are, by their nature, often subjective (Kelly 2007). 
The goal of safety case evaluation, therefore, is to assess if there is a mutual ac-
ceptance of the subjective position. 
We propose an assessment method to assess the overall sufficiency and insuf-
ficiency of safety arguments. This method consists of the two steps shown in Al-
gorithm 1. The sufficiency and insufficiency of the top goal is the overall suffi-
ciency and insufficiency of the safety argument. 
Algorithm 1. Assessment procedure 
Step 1. Evidence assessment 
 Estimate the ‘sufficiency’ and ‘insufficiency’ of each evidence node to address 
the goal it is used to support. These estimations express the degree of the re-
viewer belief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of the evidence (e.g., Ev) to 
support its goal. We use the notion of the BPA to represent these estimations. 
Formally, ( )
E v
m C , where },,{ UISC  . 
Step 2. Automatic aggregation 
 Starting from the leaves of the safety argument, apply the next steps for each 
conclusion node. 
 Aggregate the estimates of the supporting nodes to obtain the degree of be-
lief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of the conclusion (Section 4.1). 
 Recalculate the degree of belief in the sufficiency and insufficiency of the 
conclusion, in case of identifying missing supports (Section 4.2). 
 Repeat the process until the top goal has been reached. 
Confidence. The reviewer should use the confidence arguments (Ayoub et al. 
2012, Hawkins et al. 2011) or any confidence measure (Bloomfield et al. 2007, 
Denney et al. 2011) in the evidence assessment. 
Assumptions. We assume that the safety argument is understandable, free from 
structural errors (e.g., no circular arguments), fully connected (i.e., no dangling 
evidence or unsupported goal), sufficiently expressed (e.g., no missing context), 
and contains no conflicts (e.g., assumptions attached to all the argument nodes are 
consistent). These assumptions can be satisfied by applying the step-by-step re-
viewing mechanism (Kelly 2007) before running the proposed assessment 
method. More discussion of the complementary use of these two methods is given 
in Section 6. 
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4.1 Argument types 
Note that the degree of belief in the support given to a conclusion by its support-
ing nodes depends on the kind of inference used to derive the conclusion. We 
therefore begin by characterizing inference types (i.e., argument types). We use 
the case shown in Figure 1 to define the main argument types. Let n1 be a goal 
node claiming that {the system satisfies 10 safety requirements; SRs 1-10}. Ta-
ble 1 shows examples of different argument types for the same conclusion. For the 
case shown in Figure 1, we distinguish four argument types (see Figure 2). 
Table 1: Argument types example 
 Description Argument Type 
n2 
n3 
the system is formally verified against SRs 1-10 
the system is tested against SRs 1-10 
Alternative 
n2 
n3 
the system is formally verified against SRs 1-3 
the system is tested against SRs 4-10 
Disjoint, 3
1
w  and 7
2
w  
n2 
n3 
the system is formally verified against SRs 1-4 
the system is tested against SRs 4-10 
Overlap, 3
1
w , 1
Overlap
w , 
and 6
2
w  
n2 
n3 
the system is formally verified against SRs 1-4 
the system is tested against SRs 1-10 
Containment, 4
1
w  and 
6
tContainmen
w  
Ev1
n2
n3
      
n2 n3
       
n2 n3
    
n2
n3
 
    (a) Alternative              (b) Disjoint       (c) Overlap        (d) Containment 
Fig. 2. Argument types 
Alternative relates to a situation where more than one independent support of the 
common conclusion is provided. In other words, each of the supporting nodes 
supports the whole conclusion (e.g., the first row in Table 1). In this case, the rule 
given in Definition 2 is used to aggregate the mass of the sufficiency and insuffi-
ciency of n2 and n3 to obtain the mass of the sufficiency and insufficiency of n1. 
Disjoint relates to a situation where the supporting nodes provide complementary 
support for the conclusion. This means, each of the supporting nodes covers part 
of the conclusion (e.g., the second row in Table 1). In such a case, not only the 
assessments of the supporting nodes but also the weights, representing the cover-
age, associated with each supporting node are taken into account. The final as-
sessment of the conclusion is a sort of weighed average (i.e., Definition 4) of the 
contribution of all the supporting nodes. 
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Overlap relates to a situation where the supporting nodes support overlap parts of 
the conclusion. So each of the supporting nodes covers ‘not disjoint’ part of the 
conclusion (e.g., the third row in Table 1). In such a case, the weights associated 
with each supporting node and the weight of the overlap are taken into account. 
For the simple example given in Figure 2c, first the two overlapped nodes are re-
structured into three disjoint parts as shown in Figure 3a. This restructuring is 
valid under the assumption that the degree of belief in a node equals the degree of 
belief in its pieces. E.g., the degree of belief in an evidence node referring to the 
testing results for 3 safety requirements SR1, SR2, and SR3 is the same as the de-
gree of belief in the testing results for each single safety requirement SR1, SR2, 
and SR3. In other words, this combined evidence can be seen as three smaller evi-
dence nodes each of which points to the testing results for one safety requirement. 
In this case, the degree of belief in each small piece of evidence equals the degree 
of belief in the combined evidence as the same testing mechanism and settings are 
used for the three safety requirements. The middle part in Figure 3a is covered by 
both evidence nodes, so Definition 2 is applied for hypothesis },,{ UISC   
)()()(
32
CmCmCm
nnOverlap
 . 
The result is three disjoint nodes as shown in Figure 3a, so Definition 4 is applied 
twice. We can compute this by combining any pair of 
2n
m , 
O v e r la p
m , and 
3n
m  with 
the corresponding weights, and then combine the result with the remaining third 
mass. Let’s first combine 
2n
m  and 
O v e r la p
m  
Overlap
OverlapOverlapn
ermediate
ww
CmwCmw
Cm



1
21
int
)(*)(*
)(
. 
Then combine the result with 
3n
m  
21
32int1
1
)(
)(*)(*)(
)(
www
CmwCmww
Cm
Overlap
nermediateOverlap
n


 . 
The result would be 
21
3221
1
)(*)(*)(*
)(
www
CmwCmwCmw
Cm
Overlap
nOverlapOverlapn
n


 , 
where
1
w , 
O v e r la p
w and 
2
w  represent the coverage of n1 by n2 only, the overlap, 
and n3 only respectively. 
Containment relates to a situation where one supporting node coverage is in-
cluded in a bigger supporting node coverage. In other words, each of the support-
ing nodes covers part of the conclusion; this part is covered also by the next larger 
support (e.g., the last row in Table 1). In such a case, the weights associated with 
each supporting node are taken into account. For the simple example given in Fig-
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ure 2d, first the two nodes are restructured into two disjoint parts as shown in Fig-
ure 3b. This restructure is valid under the same assumption given for the overlap 
case. In Figure 3b, the degree of belief in the part covered by both supporting 
nodes is calculated by applying the rule given in Definition 2. 
)()()(
32
CmCmCm
nntContainmen
   
The result is two disjoint nodes, so Definition 4 is used:  
tContainmen
tContainmentContainmenn
n
ww
CmwCmw
Cm



1
21
1
)(*)(*
)(  
where
1
w , and
C o n ta in m en t
w represent the coverage of n1 by n2 only and the con-
tainment respectively.  
n2 n3Ev1
n2
n3
                
n2
Ev1
n2
n3
 
          (a) The overlap case                     (b) The containment case 
Figure 3. Argument types restructure 
Example 2. Table 2 shows the results of applying the aggregation rules for each 
argument type with different weights for each supporting node. 
Table 2. Example of different argument type aggregation results 
 Alternative Disjoint 
},{
21
ww  
Overlap 
},,{
21
www
Overlap
 
Containment 
},{
1 tContainmen
ww  
weights  {6, 4} {6,1,3} {5,3,2} {4,5,1} {8, 2} {5, 5} {2, 8} 
)(
1
Sm
n
 0.8148 0.58 0.592 0.6344 0.7185 0.563 0.657 0.752 
)(
1
Im
n
 0.1111 0.16 0.161 0.1533 0.1343 0.182 0.156 0.129 
We can see that for the overlap case, when the overlapping is significant then the 
results are close to the alternative case, and when the overlapping is insignificant 
then the results are close to the disjoint case (using the same weights). For the 
containment case, when one of the supports is very small, then its contribution is 
negligible, and the results are determined by the significant support. But when the 
coverage of the smaller support increases, the results become closer to the alterna-
tive case. These observations are useful in practice, because it is not always obvi-
ous how to characterize the overlapping part. In such cases, the overlap is ap-
proximated to either alternative or disjoint case based on the reviewer assessment 
for the overlapping significance. In the same way, the containment can be ap-
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proximated to either alternative case or the significant evidence numbers based on 
the reviewer assessment for the small evidence coverage. 
It is assumed that the reviewer is an expert with sufficient competence to assess 
the argument nodes and express his/her opinion (as required for Step 1 in Algo-
rithm 1), and to determine the argument type of each decomposition in the safety 
argument. The expert defines the argument type based on his/her understanding to 
the conclusion and its basis, and the supporting nodes and their basis. Where the 
node basis is defined by all context, justification, and assumption nodes attached 
to this node. 
Example 3. Figure 4 is an example to show how the node basis is important in 
identifying the argument type. By checking the supporting nodes G1 and G2, it is 
clear that the argument type is alternative as both G1 and G2 cover the whole G0 
conclusion. However, by checking A1 the expert may believe that testing reveals 
only 80% of the cases but there is 20% of the cases will not be covered by testing. 
That means G1 covers only 80% of G0, but G2 covers the whole conclusion. So 
the argument type is not alternative but containment where G1 is the small sup-
port, its weight is 0.8. 
G0
Hardware has no 
systematic flaw
G1
Test have not revealed 
any systematic hardware 
flaws
G2
Established design implies 
there will be no systematic 
hardware flaws
A
A1
Test will reveal all mis-
wiring and mis-
configuration
 
Fig. 4. Identify the argument type 
In the general case, i.e., when more than two nodes support the conclusion, the 
four argument types are still valid. In addition, a general argument type, called 
arbitrary, can be found. The arbitrary argument type corresponds to the situation 
where there is no common part to all supporting nodes, though some supporting 
nodes may cover a common part. Figure 5 shows an example of such case. The 
arbitrary argument type can be structured as a combination of alternative and dis-
joint cases. Although Dempster’s rule of combination and the mixing rule are as-
sociative and commutative, they do not have the same precedence and so when 
both rules are applied the order matters. It is the same as the case of the multipli-
cation and addition operators, both are associative and commutative but that does 
not mean that a + b + c = (a + b) * c = a + (b * c). The precedence of the aggre-
gation rules impacts significantly the calculations for the arbitrary argument type. 
For this paper, we focus on the basic four argument types (alternative, disjoint, 
overlap, and containment). Elaborating the impact of the aggregation rule prece-
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dence on the degree of belief calculations for the arbitrary case is one of the direc-
tions for future work. 
nk
n1n6
Ev1
n3
n4
n5
 
Fig. 5. Arbitrary argument type 
4.2 Missing support 
The first step in the aggregation process (Step 2 in Algorithm 1) is applying the 
corresponding aggregation rules (i.e., Definition 2 and/or Definition 4) based on 
the argument type. Then independently from the argument type, there may be part 
of the conclusion that is not covered by any of the supporting nodes. This uncov-
ered part is represented by the shading in Figures 2, 3 and 5. For all the argument 
types, the uncovered part of the conclusion can be presented as a missing support-
ing node; node nm in Figure 6, where ns represents the part of n1 that is covered 
by the provided supporting nodes. As nm is missing then we know nothing about 
it. Which means, unless the reviewer has a different opinion, the degree of belief 
in the sufficiency and insufficiency of nm are set to 0; ( ) ( ) 0
n m n m
m S m I  . In 
this case, nm is defined with the missing coverage weight 
m
w  and the weight of 
the part of n1 that is covered by ns is 
s
w . In this case, the relation between n1 as 
a conclusion and ns and nm can be seen as the disjoint case. For n1, the mass for 
hypothesis },{ ISD   is recalculated using Definition 4 as: 
ms
nss
ms
nmmnss
n
ww
Dmw
ww
DmwDmw
Dm





)(*)(*)(*
)(
1
 (1) 
n1
ns nm
 
Fig. 5. Representing the missing coverage 
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If the missing coverage is significant, then this recalculation will significantly 
decrease the mass of the conclusion sufficiency and insufficiency. On the other 
hand, the uncertainty about the conclusion increases. 
Worth notice is that based on the discussion given in Section 4.1 regarding the 
different precedence for the aggregation rules, the order of applying the rules mat-
ters. And as mns can be calculated by applying any aggregation rule based on the 
argument type, then to get consistent results the recalculation because of the miss-
ing support would be the last step to be done for any conclusion node (as shown in 
Algorithm 1). 
There are three possible sources of missing supports. We use Figure 7 as an ex-
ample to show these sources. 
G1
All identified hazards 
eliminated/sufficiently 
mitigated
C1
Identified 
Hazards (H1, H2 
and H3)
S1
Argument over all 
identified hazards
G2
Hazard H1 has been 
eliminated
Ev1
Fromal 
verification 
results
G3
Probability of H2 
occuring <1*10-6
Ev2
Fault tree 
analysis
J
J1
1*10-6 limit for 
catastrophic hazards
Ev3
Testing 
results
 
Fig. 6. A simple safety argument example 
Case 1. The expert assesses the uncovered part of the conclusion by checking the 
conclusion, the supporting nodes, and their basis including the inherited basis (i.e., 
the context, justification, and assumption nodes attached to the conclusion, the 
supporting nodes, and any node higher in the argument tree). For example, S1 
inherits context C1 form G1 (Kelly 1999). For S1, C1 identifies three hazards, 
but only two hazards are covered by G2 and G3, so only 2/3 of S1 is covered. In 
this case, using Equation 1, 
3
)(*2
)(
1
1
Dm
Dm
S
S
 . 
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Case 2. In case of explicit or implicit strategy node, the expert assesses the uncov-
ered part by evaluating the used inference. For example, for G1, the inference rule 
given in the explicit strategy S1 states {argument by hazards mitigation}. This 
inference supports G1 by showing that each individual hazard is adequately miti-
gated, but nothing is given to cover the situation of accumulated hazards. If the 
probability of getting accumulated hazards is 30%, then there is a missing support 
to G1 with a weight of 0.3. In this case, )(*7.0)(
11
DmDm
GG
 . 
Case 3. Another source of the missing support is a defective definition for the con-
clusion basis. For example, for G1, the sufficiency of the identified hazards list 
should be taken into consideration. In other words, if the hazards are not suffi-
ciently identified then a missing support is identified. For example, the expert 
would believe that only three hazards are identified in C1, while there are three 
other hazards that were not mentioned. In this case, )(
1
Dm
G
 is recalculated as 
6
)(*3
)(
1
1
Dm
Dm
G
G
 . 
As shown, more than one source of missing supports can be found for the same 
conclusion. E.g., Case 2 and Case 3 define missing supports to G1 in Figure 7. It 
is clear that the missing mitigation for H3 is already impacted the calculations for 
S1. And so for G1, Case 1 does not define missing supports. 
It is also clear that it is not important which source of missing supports is as-
sessed first as the multiplication operator is associative and commutative. But the 
important thing is to check all sources (e.g., for the given example, the resultant 
calculations for G1 would be 
6
)(*3*7.0
)(
1
1
Dm
Dm
G
G
 ). 
Note that, we assume the expert is certain about his/her opinion about the node 
basis, so that the expert is certain about his/her opinion that C1 in Figure 7 is 
missing three hazards. This may not always be the case. The expert may be uncer-
tain about his/her opinion in many different ways. For example, the expert may 
have a belief that some hazards are not defined but cannot certainly tell how many 
hazards are missing. This uncertainty should be considered in the calculations; this 
is one of the directions for the future work to extend the proposed mechanism. 
5 Illustrated example 
We use the complete simple example given in Figure 7, inspired by the example 
given in (Weaver et al. 2003), to illustrate how to apply the proposed procedure 
given in Algorithm 1. 
Step 1. Evidence assessment 
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 Assume the expert estimates as: 8.0)(
1
Sm
Ev
, 1.0)(
1
Im
Ev
, 7.0)(
21
Sm
E
, 
1.0)(
2
Im
Ev
, 5.0)(
3
Sm
Ev
 and 2.0)(
3
Im
Ev
. 
Step 2. Automatic aggregation 
 Starting from the leaves 
 For G2 
o Only one evidence Ev1 supports G2, so 8.0)()(
12
 SmSm
EvG
 and 
1.0)()(
12
 ImIm
EvG
. 
o Missing support 
o Case 1. Assume the expert opinion is that Ev1 covers the whole 
G2 conclusion. 
o Case 2. Not applicable as there is no implicit or explicit strategy 
between G2 and Ev1. 
o Case 3. The conclusion node G2 has no basis and so no dimen-
sioning is required. 
 For G2 
o Assume the expert opinion is that both Ev2 and Ev3 cover the whole 
G3 conclusion so the rule given in Definition 2 is applied. 
815.0)(
3
Sm
G
 and 111.0)(
3
Im
G
. 
o Missing support 
o Case 1. Assume the expert opinion is that conclusion G3 is totally 
covered by Ev2 and Ev3. 
o Case 2. Not applicable as there is no implicit or explicit strategy. 
o Case 3. Assume the expert opinion is that the justification J1 
covers only 80% of the cases. By applying equation 1, 
652.0)(
3
Sm
G
 and 089.0)(
3
Im
G
. 
 Repeat the process  
 For S1 
o It is clear that the argument type is disjoint. Assume all hazards have 
the same importance; the weights of all hazards are equal. Using Defi-
nition 4, 726.0)(
1
Sm
S
 and 094.0)(
1
Im
S
. 
o Missing support: this is given as example in Section 4.2. The recalcu-
lation result: 484.0)(
1
Sm
S
 and 063.0)(
1
Im
S
. 
 For G1 
o Strategy S1 is the only support to G1, so 484.0)()(
11
 SmSm
SG
 
and 063.0)()(
11
 ImIm
SG
. 
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o Missing support: this is the example discussed in Section 4.2. The re-
sult is that 169.0)(
1
Sm
G
 and 022.0)(
1
Im
G
. 
The calculations are summarized in Figure 8. In this case, the mass of the overall 
sufficiency and insufficiency of the safety argument given in Figure 7 equal 0.169 
and 0.022 respectively, and the uncertainty equals 0.809. Using these numbers the 
expert can decide if this safety argument should be rejected or not. In the given 
example, most probably the expert would reject this safety argument as the degree 
of uncertainty is very high relative to the degree of belief of the argument suffi-
ciency which is quite low. In addition, the expert can provide aclear feedback to 
the submitter guiding where enhancements are required. For the given argument, it 
is clear that the first effective weakness of this argument is missing mitigation for 
H3. The inappropriate identification for the hazards has a significant negative im-
pact as well. 
0. 
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1. 
Sufficient Uncertian Insufficient
 
Fig. 7. The example numbers 
6 Related work 
The proposed assessing mechanism can be used in conjunction with the step-by-
step review mechanism proposed in (Kelly 2007) to answer the question given in 
the last step of this reviewing mechanism, which is of the overall sufficiency of 
the safety argument. At the same time, applying the step-by-step reviewing 
mechanism guarantees the assumptions of the proposed mechanism as given in 
 Assessing the Overall Sufficiency of Safety Arguments      17 
  
Section 4. In other words, the step-by-step review mechanism provides a skeleton 
for a systematic review process; however the proposed assessment mechanism 
provides a systematic procedure to measure the sufficiency and insufficiency of 
the safety arguments.  
An appraisal mechanism is proposed in (Cyra and Gorski 2008a) to assess the 
trust cases. Although this mechanism targets trust cases and the proposed mecha-
nism targets safety cases, both mechanisms use the Dempster-Shaffer model. Both 
mechanisms propose different aggregation rules based on the argument types. 
However, the argument types are not identical. The proposed argument types 
cover the case when the falsification of one of the premises decreases, but not nul-
lifies, the support for the conclusion. This case is also covered for the trust cases 
appraisal mechanism, however only two argument types are defined; alternative 
and complementary (i.e., disjoint). The additional argument types we defined (i.e., 
overlap and containment) are treated as an alternative or a complementary type 
based on the overlap significance. Another case defined for the appraisal mecha-
nism is when the falsification of a single premise leads to the rebuttal of the con-
clusion or to the rejection of the whole argument because nothing can be inferred 
about the conclusion. Two argument types are defined for this case; necessary and 
sufficient condition list (NSC-argument) and sufficient condition list (SC-
argument). These two argument types are not considered in the proposed mecha-
nism because we believe that for safety cases, each premise should have a contri-
bution in supporting the conclusion. So no single premise has such a huge impact 
that it may lead to the rejection of the whole argument. And in case of a single 
premise that is sufficient to reject the whole argument then it is a simple process to 
check that premise and decide about the argument rejection without any aggrega-
tion. 
The linguistic scales given in (Cyra and Gorski 2008b) to express the expert 
opinions and the aggregation results are appealing. In their work, the linguistic 
values are mapped into the interval [0, 1] and then quantitative rules are used for 
the aggregation (Cyra and Gorski 2008a). Although linguistic scales are more ap-
propriate for human decisions than numbers, the mapping has a significant impact 
on the computed results and there is no evidence that the used mapping is proper. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an assessment method to assess the overall sufficiency 
and insufficiency of safety arguments. For the proposed mechanism, there are 
various parts that require interaction with the reviewer. The reviewer has to assess 
the evidence hypotheses, the argument types, the existence and the weight of 
missing supports, and the inference deficits. In other words, the proposed method 
does not replace the reviewer; instead it provides a framework to lead the reviewer 
through the evaluation process and to combine the reviewer estimates.  
One of the main limitations of the proposed method is that the evidence nodes 
have to be independent as required by Dempster-Shafer Theory. However in many 
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safety arguments, evidence nodes are not independent. Extending the proposed 
mechanism to cover this dependency is one of the directions for future work. 
Our preliminary experience of applying the proposed method has revealed that 
the assessing mechanism yields the expected benefits in guiding the safety argu-
ment reviewer and helping him/her to reduce the effect of the confirmation bias 
mindset. 
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